Should we really be worried about France’s declining fertility rate?
- The year 2023 marked a fall in the fertility rate in France, with the number of births down 6.7% on the previous year.
- In European countries, a pattern seems to be emerging around the figure of 1.5 children per woman.
- The reasons for this convergence include the later arrival of the first child, changes in gender relations, and the importance given by women to their professional careers.
- In theory, this demographic change will not affect the pension system until more than 20 years from now, when the younger generations enter the labour market.
- There is no proven link between good economic health and high fertility rates, and pro-natalist policies generally have very little effect on the number of births.
Fertility rates fell sharply in France in 2023. How do you explain this?
In 2023, 678,000 babies were born in France, 6.7% fewer than in 2020 and 16% fewer than in 2010. We are now at an average of 1.68 children per woman, the lowest fertility rate since 1945. There was a very rapid fall last year, which no one quite understands. We don’t know what could have caused this sudden downturn; there were no major political or economic events, as was the case in the United States in 2009, for example, following the credit crunch. It would be irresponsible to attempt to oversimplify the reasons behind this sharp fall. Nor is there any link with the Covid-19 pandemic. The decline in fertility began around 2012 in France, when there was a marked drop. The decline was then fairly steady until 2023.
How does France compare with birth rates in Europe and the rest of the world?
Globally, the contrasts are increasing. The world can be divided into three main regions: a part of Africa, from the Sahel to Botswana, where there is a demographic explosion, with the record being Niger (6.8 children per woman); the Far East, where fertility is falling rapidly, with the record being South Korea (0.78 children per woman); and finally, the rest of the world, where births fluctuate between 1.5 and 2.5 children per woman on average.
France has had one of the highest birth rates in Europe for quite some time, and this is still the case, but not by much. Ireland and Romania are more or less at the same level. Across the European Union, there is convergence at around 1.5 children per woman. Eurostat data clearly show a fairly sharp fall in all the European countries where births were highest. On the other hand, where fertility was the lowest, it has remained so or risen slightly. There is no doubt that a European family model is emerging.
Are there any explanations for the convergence of European countries around the figure of 1.5 children per woman?
The main reason for this convergence is a change in the relationship between men and women. Women, who are far more highly educated than men, are less accepting of the double working day and the unequal division of labour than they were in the 1980s, for example. This mechanism is in the process of being set in motion in many European countries. In addition, the average age of mothers at the birth of their first child continues to rise, which technically reduces fertility, as it is spread over a slightly longer period. For this reason, the fertility rate falls at younger ages, up to 30–35, then stabilises and rises thereafter. Finally, there is an increase in the proportion of women who have no children or only one.
Are we facing a major change in the birth rate, like the baby boom, for example?
It’s the same thing because there is a turning point. When you follow demographic indices, there is a point at which they reverse, but that takes time. It takes at least one generation; every 30 or 40 years. So, there was the baby-boom generation, the generation that delayed childbearing, and now we’re facing a reversal that will lead to a fairly low fertility rate of around 1.5 children per woman.
We always think that immediate events will have consequences, but only a few events mark a rapid change. The oil crisis in 1973 was a major turning point, but it was preceded by the arrival of modern contraception in 1965, which triggered a fall in fertility.
What impact could the drop in births have on the country’s economy?
There is a lot of confusion about this impact. At the time of the pension reform, the political right claimed that the drop in the birth rate was very serious for the balance of the system. In reality, it depends on the time frame you look at. The pension system will only be affected when the generations born today enter the labour market, i.e. in just over 20 years’ time. Until 2045, therefore, there will be no problem in relation to pensions. Will there be any negative consequences in the short or medium term? It’s difficult to say. There will be changes in consumption, an increase in purchasing power for adults, lower costs for schools, or the possibility of having fewer children per class… It’s not all negative or positive. I carried out a study showing that the problem of pensions will affect the generations that have had fewer or no children, so they will have had more disposable income for themselves at the ages when children are conceived. This makes sense in a way that is rarely mentioned.
Is there a clear link between a country’s economic health and population growth?
No, that’s an old idea. The French have very much hoped that there would be a link. There have been many studies, notably those by the economist Alfred Sauvy, but they have never shown anything of the sort. Correlations don’t work. It’s too disjointed, there are so many intermediaries between economic and demographic growth, such as education, investment…
If there is no evidence that a high birth rate leads to economic growth, why do we pay so much attention to the birth rate in France?
The importance of fertility dates back to the defeat by Germany in 1870. It was thought that because the Germans had more children, they would have more soldiers. The defeat was equated with France’s low fertility rate, which was incorrect. In reality, Germany had fewer soldiers at the time. The Church claimed that the defeat was a punishment because the French were not having enough children. This was a source of regret, which led to the development of pro-natalist movements. The idea spread that it was bad to have only one child. Psychologists claimed that an only child socialised badly, which later led to the creation of nurseries and crèches. Combating the one-child policy ensured that the fertility rate rose again during the baby boom from 1945–1946 onwards. It’s a question of morals, specific to France. Countries such as England and Germany have never been afraid of having low fertility rates; in fact, historically, the opposite has been true. So, there is still this idea in the French mentality that having children is good for the country. This theme is particularly strong among politicians, because it shows that they care about the nation.
Emmanuel Macron wants to introduce parental leave to bring about a “demographic rearmament”. Do pro-natalist policies have any real effect on the birth rate?
Birth rate policies have almost no effect. Many studies have been carried out, particularly in other countries. In 1967, Romanian President Nicolae Ceaușescu banned abortion. The following year, fertility doubled, but it quickly dropped again. In China, contrary to popular belief, it was not the one-child policy that caused a fall in birth rates. By 1978, when it was introduced, China had already gone from 5 children per woman to 2.7. This measure merely accompanied the trend. And when the one-child policy was abandoned in 2016, instead of rising, fertility plummeted (to 1.11 children per woman in 2022).
In European countries, there is often a windfall effect following a pro-natalist measure. There is a small rise in the number of births in the following year or two, then a small fall, and the initial level is reached again. In Hungary, a pro-natalist policy is currently being implemented. However, fertility trends are evolving in the same way as in neighbouring countries. Small advantages are not going to change a decision as important as that of building a family. OECD economist Olivier Thévenon puts the increase in fertility at 5% if we offset a quarter of the cost of having a child, which is a lot. That’s 0.1 children in France. Increasingly, the distribution of fertility rates corresponds to major cultural groupings, such as Southern Europe and East Asia…
