sienceEtDefiance_TriBonMuavais doute
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What does it mean to “trust science”?

How to filter good doubt from bad

with Agnès Vernet, Science journalist
On June 23rd, 2021 |
4min reading time
Jean-Gabriel Ganascia
Jean-Gabriel Ganascia
Professor of computer science at Sorbonne University and Philosopher
Key takeaways
  • Doubt is an essential element of science, and in the scientific community, the absence of consensus is the norm.
  • But in the face of this inherent mistrust in scientists, society is currently crossed by another form of doubt: a general skepticism questioning the results of science.
  • Nevertheless, doubt must be part of the scientific process. For Jean-Gabriel Ganascia, it is therefore essential to give science, and particularly the scientific method, a central place in education.

Science without suspicion

Science without conscience is but the ruin of the soul”, Rabe­lais once said. We could also mis­quote by saying “Science without sus­pi­cion is but the ruin of the soul”, given that scep­ti­cism is an essen­tial dri­ving force of science. Without it, know­ledge would remain abso­lute. Science involves ques­tio­ning the most obvious truths. A scien­tist is natu­ral­ly trou­bled. He is willing to ques­tion eve­ry­thing, and to that end, he nur­tures a “good” form of doubt, one that is construc­tive and methodical.

Because of the scien­tists’ natu­ral scep­ti­cism, socie­ty is ridd­led with ano­ther form of doubt : wides­pread scep­ti­cism, chal­len­ging the results of science. When both phe­no­me­na meet, scien­tists become hos­tages of their own doubt. 

In the scien­ti­fic com­mu­ni­ty, lack of consen­sus is a nor­mal situa­tion. Science advances by contro­ver­sy, which is even­tual­ly resolved.

In the scien­ti­fic com­mu­ni­ty, absence of consen­sus is natu­ral. Science moves for­ward through contro­ver­sial debates which end up being resol­ved. A result or an expe­riment takes into consi­de­ra­tion two or three dif­ferent views, new ques­tions emerge, and novel contro­ver­sies are for­med. Howe­ver, in the public sphere scien­tists only cri­ti­cise to offer coun­ter-argu­ments, not to advance the unders­tan­ding of a phe­no­me­non. This stance has nothing to do with scien­ti­fic doubt.

As long as scien­tists wor­ked on the fringes of the public sphere, contro­ver­sies were confi­ned to the scien­ti­fic com­mu­ni­ty. Nowa­days, thanks to open access publi­ca­tions and other forms of know­ledge dis­se­mi­na­tion, the cir­cu­la­tion of science has ope­ned up. On one hand, this sha­ring of know­ledge is an oppor­tu­ni­ty, but on the other, it is met by a col­lec­tive form of mis­trust. The first months of the Covid-19 out­break in 2020 are a stri­king example of this phe­no­me­non. Resear­chers and doc­tors in France who natu­ral­ly confron­ted their hypo­theses faced “60 mil­lion viro­lo­gists”. A clash bet­ween scep­ti­cism and mistrust.

The methodology of defiance

When a scien­tist doubts, he does not do so without method. If he ques­tions a fact, some­times just to explore in grea­ter depth an ele­ment in a given issue, in return, he accepts that his ques­tion can be rebut­ted. Whe­reas in public opi­nion, objec­tion is com­plete. Cri­ti­cism is not inten­ded to solve pro­blems, it is an asser­tive stance, a com­mit­ment. In some debates, par­ti­cu­lar­ly in the media, we thus wit­ness the confron­ta­tion bet­ween convic­tions and hypo­theses. A mix of genres that sows confu­sion and rat­tles more than one scientist.

As ear­ly as 2018, the pro­blem of scien­ti­fic pos­ture at the time of post-truth poli­tics was the sub­ject of a report direc­ted by the Ethi­cal Comi­ty of the Centre Natio­nal de Recherche Scien­ti­fique (CNRS)1, to which I belong. This exer­cise reminds us that orga­ni­sed scep­ti­cism, as advo­ca­ted by the Ame­ri­can epis­te­mo­lo­gist Robert King Mer­ton in its defi­ni­tion of an ideal of pure science, does not chal­lenge know­ledge. It is rather a rigo­rous col­lec­tive pro­cess, a metho­do­lo­gy to express doubt. Each step which brings a scien­tist clo­ser to a fact gene­rates new hypo­theses. The scien­ti­fic com­mu­ni­ty then mea­sures the gap bet­ween the unders­tan­ding of this phe­no­me­non in this new theo­re­ti­cal space and its rele­vance to the world. Doubt is orga­ni­sed to bring new know­ledge and insight.

Defiance in the public sphere is alto­ge­ther a dif­ferent mat­ter. Mis­trust is built on the sus­pi­cion that per­so­nal inter­ests might cor­rupt research inte­gri­ty. Yet, if out­side his labo­ra­to­ry a scien­tist may have social ambi­tions and be influen­ced by com­plex motives, scien­tists as a com­mu­ni­ty are only dri­ven by the search for truth.

Para­doxi­cal­ly, this col­lec­tive dimen­sion might have been over­sha­do­wed by “science stu­dies”, a social sciences field which stu­dies how scien­ti­fic exper­tise works. By sug­ges­ting that power issues in the scien­ti­fic com­mu­ni­ty are iden­ti­cal to those in other areas of socie­ty, they have over­loo­ked the acid test that is scien­ti­fic expe­rience. In science, truth always comes out as new facts are dis­co­ve­red. We bow down before evidence.

Public mis­trust in the face of science also thrives on post-truth speech, mea­ning argu­ments impo­sed by force, without any form of evi­dence. This post-truth regime is some­times deli­be­rate, when it serves eco­no­mic, poli­ti­cal, ideo­lo­gi­cal or reli­gious inter­ests. It often arises from a simple assu­med indif­fe­rence in rela­tion to the facts.

Restore science education to its rightful place 

To fight mis­trust and help the public to dis­tin­guish good doubt from wides­pread sus­pi­cion, scien­tists only have few tools at their dis­po­sal. It is very dif­fi­cult to convince the gene­ral public that all the mat­ters cal­led into ques­tion are not legitimate.

We must first­ly remind the facts, pro­vide evi­dence. This is what dif­ferent media ensure with “fact che­cking”. This exer­cise has now become essen­tial. None­the­less, it is not enough, the amount of false infor­ma­tion cir­cu­la­ting is still too great. Fur­ther­more, the per­ni­cious impact per­sists even though fal­la­cy has been demons­tra­ted. The public is not made of scien­ti­fic minds.

The public is not made up of scien­ti­fic minds. It is the­re­fore cru­cial to bet­ter explain the scien­ti­fic pro­cess in pri­ma­ry school.

It is the­re­fore cru­cial to start explai­ning the scien­ti­fic approach in pri­ma­ry school. This wish­ful thin­king is howe­ver ham­pe­red by the ini­tial trai­ning of school tea­chers, who most­ly have a lite­ra­ture back­ground. This ques­tion of science trai­ning from a very ear­ly age remains a major lever.

In my view, it would also be use­ful to teach the his­to­ry of science. This dis­ci­pline has the merit of sho­wing that science makes pro­gress through trial and error. It shows the nature of scien­ti­fic contro­ver­sy and, com­bi­ned with epis­te­mo­lo­gy, it helps explain the way ideas are built. These approaches are still poor­ly repre­sen­ted, inclu­ding in aca­de­mic courses. They could never­the­less be metho­do­lo­gi­cal allies for resear­chers, or even, if taught in high school, res­tore scien­ti­fic unders­tan­ding in gene­ral knowledge.

1https://​comite​-ethique​.cnrs​.fr/​a​v​i​s​-​d​u​-​c​o​m​e​t​s​-​q​u​e​l​l​e​s​-​n​o​u​v​e​l​l​e​s​-​r​e​s​p​o​n​s​a​b​i​l​i​t​e​s​-​p​o​u​r​-​l​e​s​-​c​h​e​r​c​h​e​u​r​s​-​a​-​l​h​e​u​r​e​-​d​e​s​-​d​e​b​a​t​s​-​s​u​r​-​l​a​-​p​o​s​t​-​v​e​rite/

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