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Industry, shortages, diplomacy: the ripples of war in Ukraine

Strategic autonomy : Europe’s awakening

with Richard Robert, Journalist and Author
On May 25th, 2022 |
4min reading time
Riccardo Perissisch 1
Riccardo Perissisch
Research Director at the LUISS School of Political Economics (Rome)
Key takeaways
  • In 2017, Emmanuel Macron’s proposal of "strategic autonomy" was initially met with reluctance in Europe, particularly because some countries were disinterested in defence issues.
  • The Russian-Ukrainian crisis has changed the game, revealing the nature of the Russian threat, highlighting the previous misunderstanding between "autonomy" and "NATO membership."
  • In response, the EU has reacted with speed and determination, the most spectacular development being that of Germany.
  • A European defence programme could now be possible but will not be easy to create because of the weight of the existing contracts and programs.
  • Cyber defence, a new subject, is the easiest to implement at federal level.

Until the last few weeks, the “strategic autonomy”  advocated for in Paris had little success with other European countries. Why ?

The ideas pre­sen­ted by Pre­sident Macron in Sep­tem­ber 2017 in his Sor­bonne speech regar­ding Euro­pean stra­te­gic auto­no­my, were the pro­duct of cur­rent events. The pre­si­den­cy of Donald Trump had brought about a change in the stra­te­gic vision of the Uni­ted States, which had begun with Oba­ma. We were ente­ring a world where, due to the growth of Chi­na and a har­de­ning of inter­na­tio­nal rela­tions, the com­pla­cen­cy of Euro­peans regar­ding inter­na­tio­nal pro­blems could not last.

Because of this situa­tion, Pre­sident Macron Europe said Europe had to wake up. But when a pro­po­sal is made by Paris, it is often gree­ted with a cer­tain amount of mis­trust. There are seve­ral rea­sons for this. On the one hand, there is a cer­tain pom­po­si­ty that is cha­rac­te­ris­tic of French debate, and which is poor­ly unders­tood out­side France. Second­ly, there is a dis­trust that exists eve­ryw­here in Europe (and even more so in the Uni­ted States): eve­ry time a sug­ges­tion on inter­na­tio­nal poli­cy comes from Paris, it is inter­pre­ted in a neo-Gaul­list sense. The French must be aware of this. The word “auto­no­my” used by Macron has been wide­ly inter­pre­ted in this way out­side France, which has made the dis­cus­sion more difficult.

But this mis­trust of the French pro­po­sal hid ano­ther pro­blem : some Euro­peans, nota­bly Ger­ma­ny and Ita­ly, were living in com­pla­cen­cy and denial. They consi­de­red that the inter­na­tio­nal sys­tem was safe, that if there were any dan­gers, we could count on the Ame­ri­cans, and that our inter­est was above all to look after our eco­no­mic and com­mer­cial inter­ests, inclu­ding with Rus­sia and China.

Under these condi­tions, it is not sur­pri­sing that coun­tries that had a much more pre­cise per­cep­tion of threats to their secu­ri­ty, such as Poland, the Bal­tic coun­tries, or the Scan­di­na­vians, could find the Euro­pean Union of lit­tle use from a stra­te­gic point of view, which fur­ther streng­the­ned their attach­ment to NATO. With the Biden admi­nis­tra­tion, reas­su­ring mes­sages began to mul­ti­ply, which cer­tain­ly hel­ped to ligh­ten the atmos­phere. But the misun­ders­tan­dings did not disap­pear. All these misun­ders­tan­dings have been swept away by the cur­rent crisis.

How has this crisis changed the game ?

It has shown two things. The first is that Putin’s real inter­est is not NATO, which is just a pre­text for the whole ope­ra­tion. His real inter­est is, on the one hand, to re-esta­blish a sphere of influence beyond Rus­sia’s bor­ders and to re-esta­blish what can still be saved from the Soviet empire. And, on the other hand, to avoid the demo­cra­tic conta­mi­na­tion coming from his neigh­bours, at all costs. But the fact that bet­ween Ukraine and Rus­sia there are, as he insists on remin­ding us, deep his­to­ri­cal, eth­nic, and cultu­ral links makes this dan­ger of conta­mi­na­tion even grea­ter. If demo­cra­cy were to suc­ceed in Ukraine, inevi­ta­bly the Rus­sians would see it. So, for Putin, it is a ques­tion of sur­vi­val. Eve­ry­thing could have been dif­ferent if, after the fall of the Soviet Union, Rus­sia had taken a dif­ferent path. But it is not because of us that it could not do so. It was its inter­nal dia­lec­tics that led it to replace com­mu­nism with an auto­cra­cy, pas­sing from Joseph Sta­lin to Joseph de Maistre.

The cur­rent cri­sis has also revea­led that Atlan­tic uni­ty and Euro­pean uni­ty were not contra­dic­to­ry, but on the contra­ry were clo­se­ly lin­ked. There is no Euro­pean uni­ty pos­sible without Atlan­tic uni­ty. And sym­me­tri­cal­ly, Atlan­tic uni­ty is inef­fec­tive if Euro­peans are not uni­ted. This is an impor­tant les­son of this crisis.

It was not obvious, because mis­trust did not disap­pear. Among the Euro­peans : did the Ame­ri­cans want to talk to the Rus­sians over their heads ? The Ame­ri­cans, for their part, did not believe that the Euro­peans would be up to the task. Indeed, it was not easy to get the Ger­mans and Ita­lians to move. Final­ly, many people won­de­red why Macron was going to Mos­cow. All this, in a sys­tem that involves a num­ber of demo­cra­cies, was pro­ba­bly inevi­table. But the result is extra­or­di­na­ry. Nobo­dy expec­ted such a strong consen­sus in such a short time. All those who expec­ted pure­ly sym­bo­lic sanc­tions should rethink their opinion.

And I would add that there is a game chan­ger in what has hap­pe­ned in the last few days, when Ger­man Chan­cel­lor Olaf Scholz announ­ced a spec­ta­cu­lar increase in his defence bud­get. If Ger­ma­ny spent 2 % of its GDP on defence, its defence bud­get would far exceed that of Rus­sia. Ber­lin’s change of course is fun­da­men­tal : it can be com­pa­red to Hel­mut Kohl’s deci­sion to give up the deutsche mark and join the euro.

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Will a defensive Europe finally come into being ?

It is now pos­sible, and France has a par­ti­cu­lar res­pon­si­bi­li­ty here. When it comes to forei­gn poli­cy and defence, because of its inter­na­tio­nal posi­tion, its seat at the Uni­ted Nations, its nuclear deterrent, France objec­ti­ve­ly occu­pies the same place as Ger­ma­ny in eco­no­mic and mone­ta­ry mat­ters. There is a sort of lea­der­ship obli­ga­tion on the French side. France must be able to remove the ambi­gui­ty concer­ning rela­tions with NATO, which will not prevent us, depen­ding on the cir­cum­stances, from asser­ting our inter­ests with regards tothe Ame­ri­cans. Howe­ver, this ambi­gui­ty must be remo­ved, other­wise the European’s will struggle to reach a consensus.

Also, Euro­pean defence will be dif­fi­cult to create because it imposes indus­trial opti­mi­sa­tions that are always dif­fi­cult to nego­tiate. The­re­fore, I think that prio­ri­ty should be given to cyber defence. Rus­sia has been giving us an excellent les­son in hybrid war­fare for seve­ral years, with a conti­nui­ty bet­ween false infor­ma­tion, cyber-attacks and high inten­si­ty war­fare. Cyber defence is a sec­tor where Europe is lag­ging, even though it is a real com­mon inter­est. Moreo­ver, we know that digi­tal tech­no­lo­gies are « dual », with civi­lian and mili­ta­ry uses : there is the­re­fore an objec­tive, stra­te­gic but also eco­no­mic interest.

Final­ly, it will undoub­ted­ly be dif­fi­cult to achieve una­ni­mi­ty qui­ck­ly, but a hard core will be nee­ded. In addi­tion to France and Ger­ma­ny, it should include at least Poland, Ita­ly, and Spain, but also Swe­den and the Nether­lands. Poland becomes a key coun­try here, which can help us to resolve the other dis­putes we have with it. This oppor­tu­ni­ty has never been pre­sen­ted before, and the win­dow may close again because the inter­na­tio­nal situa­tion may wor­sen, the Uni­ted States will enter a situa­tion of inter­nal dif­fi­cul­ties, pola­ri­sa­tion and all our coun­tries are facing eco­no­mic and social pro­blems. So, we must exploit it.

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